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 This thesis will address the issue of appealing (or deferring) to the authority of expertise. 
The effects of the social character of knowledge highlight two points with regard to this issue. 
First, they leave the layman in an epistemically inferior position. Thus, the layman must appeal 
to the authority of experts. The second point, related to the first point, is the implicit role of trust 
in deferring to expert authority. Though I will pay attention to each of these points, the focus of 
this thesis will be on the former. If we accept that one must appeal to the authority of experts in 
order to be on epistemically firm ground, then as a consequence we leave ourselves open to the 
problem of adjudicating between conflicting expert testimonies. The goal of this thesis will be to 
examine a process by which one can arrive at the most epistemically justified position given the 




 In today’s world, it appears as though we are surrounded by controversy. To some 
degree, this is nothing new. After all, it is a rumpus that we can trace back to ancient times. Plato 
writes in the Charmides,  
[W]hen a person claims to know something, will our friend be able to find out 
whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know it. (Cooper 1997, 
657) 
 
Even then, people were trying to find a way around this problem of knowing when someone is an 
expert. Today, we can say the problem has evolved. Some authors, like David Bloor (1976), feel 
that knowledge is different today. Knowledge is no longer something that one man possesses, but 
rather a conglomeration of understanding from several specialized fields.  
 John Hardwig writes in “The Role of Trust in Knowledge,” 
Modern knowers cannot be independent and self-reliant, not even in their own 
fields of specialization. In most disciplines, those who do not trust cannot know; 
those who do not trust cannot have the best evidence for their beliefs. (1991, 693-
694) 
 
Hardwig is making a similar point to Bloor. There is an implicit trust that is built into the 
production of knowledge in the modern era. When one does research, even in their own field, 
they must trust that the backs of giants on which they stand were firmly based in sound scientific 
practice. That is to say, they must trust that the other experts, whose work they reference, are 
indeed in possession of the expertise that we attribute to them. 
 The question of the expertise of experts is a difficult one to assess, and is by no means 
easier today than it was 2 millennia ago. The increased specialization of fields contributes to the 
creation of more experts to work in those areas. As knowledge becomes more complex, more 
experts must come together from differing fields to unearth it. In two of his papers, Hardwig 
discusses an experiment that measured the lifespan of charm particles in physics. “The paper 
 1
reporting the results of this experiment has 99 authors, in part because it took about 280 
person/years to do the experiment” (1991, 695). Not only was there a time factor, but the 
experiment itself required scientists from many different fields of particle physics. 
 Naturally, this is a lot of trust that is going around. The trust that we place in the 
knowledge this team has extracted of charm particles is based on a very complex and fragile 
system. It is safe to say that the likelihood of any individual scientist making an error is quite 
small, and we would expect that as we pool more scientists together, we would be decreasing the 
chance for error. After all, is this not how peer review operates in a scientific community?  
 Though I do not claim to deny that peer review can indeed weed out some forms of bias, 
the point I wish to make here is that we should not rule out what Kahneman and Tversky (1973) 
called the “conjunctive and disjunctive fallacies.” Under these conditions, people often 
misinterpret the probability of an event occurring. One common example of such a 
misconception is in risk assessment. It is believed that since each component in a nuclear reactor 
has such a negligible chance of failure, that the system is reliable and safe. What often gets 
neglected is that since the system is quite large, a failure in any one piece can cause failure to the 
system. Thus, there is an increasing chance for failure as we add more parts to the system, 
despite each part having such a small probability of failure. 
 If we turn back to the example of charm particles, we can see how the failure of one 
scientist could have had a significant impact on the results of that experiment, and thus our 
knowledge of charm particles. What I am trying to highlight here is the importance of having a 
rigorous system for evaluating expert opinion. In cases like the charm particles, what is at stake 
is our understanding of a small area of particle physics. Other cases have much higher stakes 
since they involve international trade law, international environmental policy, and people’s lives.  
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 The effects of CFCs on the ozone and greenhouse gases on global warming are two 
examples of public policy issues that require, or required, well informed decisions (see Weiss 
2003). On the one hand in these debates is the global economy. Unnecessary restrictions on 
industry based on speculative concerns can do severe damage to the global economy. On the 
other hand, failure to acknowledge the risks posed by non-regulation can lead to irreversible 
global environmental damage. Therefore, the effects of the decisions require that they be made 
with a strong degree of epistemic justification, i.e., a well informed basis.  
 The decision to regulate CFCs was an early decision which proved to be quite beneficial. 
As we later discovered, CFCs were destroying the stratosphere which in turn led to the creation 
of a hole in the ozone over Antarctica. We now face a similar problem with respect to global 
warming. Unfortunately, in this case an informed decision has not been swift in coming. Though 
global warming is an incredibly complex issue, 178 countries came together in 2001 and 
recognized the importance of this problem, and as with the CFCs, they have moved for stiffer 
regulations. The US was not one of them, and has only recently begun to take action beyond the 
Kyoto Protocol due to political pressure.  
 Another example is derived from international trade law, and to some degree human 
health. The use of genetically modified food is a matter of serious concern. Some countries are 
claiming that we do not know enough to simply eat these products carefree. For example, the 
European Communities tried to block the import of beef from the US, since many farmer use 
growth hormones. The other side of this issue concerns world hunger. Without genetically 
modified crops, many countries will simply fail to get enough food. Though the World Trade 
Organization has denied the right of the EC to block trade, this issue is far from resolved. The 
health and hunger of many people lie in the balance. 
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 Finally, I will turn to two other issues involving public health and well being. The first is 
a hot issue in toxicology known as hormesis (see Kaiser 2003). Hormesis is a condition by which 
chemicals exhibit opposite properties at high doses and low doses. Many scientists working on 
hormesis wish to focus on chemicals that are beneficial at low doses, and toxic at higher doses. 
One popular example involves dioxin. Dioxin, when given to rats in small doses, gives them a 
50/50 chance of dying from liver cancer. However, when given in even smaller doses, it has been 
shown to inhibit tumors.  
 There are many examples of hormesis in nature. Another popular one involves arsenic, 
which can cause immune cells to proliferate faster when given in small doses. But, not all cases 
of hormesis are good. Some scientists point to the fact that though dioxin suppresses breast 
tumors, it can also promote liver tumors. In other cases, toxicants called ‘endocrine disruptors’ 
were found to be more toxic at smaller doses than at high doses. Thus, the government decisions 
surrounding the regulation of these chemicals, and their effects on the environment and public 
health need to be well informed due to the complexity of the issue.  
 The final case that I will reference here involves AIDS in South Africa. As we will later 
see, there is a strong debate between whether or not more research is needed on the topic of HIV 
as the cause of AIDS. Ward Jones (2002) will argue that there is greater epistemic justification in 
the majority held position, while President Thabo Mbeki argues for consideration of the 
alternatives. The ultimate decision in this case determines whether or not a significant portion of 
the population is given anti-HIV medication as treatment for, and the prevention of, AIDS. 
 Each of these cases demonstrates the profound effects that follow from public policy 
decisions. In each of these cases, we would hope that the ultimate decision maker takes every 
precaution available to them to ensure a well informed decision. Thus, it is my intention in this 
paper to give a deeper examination of the problem of deference to expert authority. In the first 
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three chapters of the paper, I will explore some of the previous work in the area. My goal in 
these sections will be to critically evaluate each of these three positions.  I intend to harvest the 
fruitful arguments, so that I may then, in the fourth chapter, synthesize these ideas into a process 
that will yield a higher degree of epistemic justification, and thus a more informed decision. 
 Each of the first three chapters constitutes a different author’s perspective on this issue. 
The first chapter will provide a nice technical vocabulary derived from the concepts in social 
empiricism. This vocabulary will allow for a neutral approach to issues like “bias” in science. As 
such, it will be indispensable to discussing and classifying the motivations that one has for siding 
with a particular position. Furthermore, the discussion of social empiricism will also provide a 
framework for understanding what it means to have, to be in, and to lack consensus between 
scientists. The understanding of this will be crucial, since it will bring more clarity to the various 
positions, such as the majority position. In addition to this, it will also bring added focus to the 
relation between the positions with respect to productive science.  
 In the second chapter, I will take a look at Ward Jones’s (2002) approach to dealing with 
the problem of choosing between experts. Analysis of this argument will yield insights into how 
others have attempted to solve the problem at hand. This argument will provide an excellent 
starting position, since I will first need to address the holes left open by Jones’ argument.  
 The third chapter will take a slightly different turn from chapter two. Whereas in chapter 
two I will examine an attempt to solve the problem, chapter three will look into a wider 
exploration of the problem. Though Alvin Goldman (2001) does not offer any solutions to the 
problem, his work will help to provide added insights into the issues that a viable solution would 
be required to address.  
 In the fourth chapter, I will bring together the constructive ideas from the previous 
chapters. I will begin by clarifying the relation between expert and layman, as well as some of 
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the issues that I see as facing each side. This groundwork, combined with the observations from 
social empiricism, will allow me to derive a process, or flowchart that one may use to arrive at an 
informed decision (qua a superior epistemically justified position).  
 This thesis will address the issue of appealing (or deferring) to the authority of expertise. 
The effects of the social character of knowledge highlight two points with regard to this issue. 
First, they leave the layman in an epistemically inferior position. Thus, the layman must appeal 
to the authority of experts. The second point, which can be derived from the first point, is the 
implicit role of trust in deferring to expert authority. Though I will pay attention to each of these 
points, the focus of this thesis will be on the former. If we accept that one must appeal to the 
authority of experts in order to be on epistemically firm ground, then as a consequence will leave 
ourselves open to the problem of mitigating between conflicting expert testimonies. The goal of 
this thesis will be to examine a process by which one can arrive at the most epistemically 






Miriam Solomon argues for a new epistemology of science in her book Social 
Empiricism (2001).   She introduces her position by first showing how others have focused on 
the individual scientist as the locus for reason and objectivity, and then claiming that she will 
instead try to show that the locus of reason and objectivity lies with the community. Solomon 
argues that in previous debates, although there was disagreement over the conclusions, an 
underlying assumption was accepted. She claims that this assumption, Enlightenment 
epistemology, became the framework for the debate. The goal of her book is to challenge this 
framework. 
Whig Realism and Empirical Success 
Solomon chooses to divide successes in science into two categories: empirical successes 
and theoretical successes. For example, predictive success would serve as an empirical success, 
while simplicity would serve as a theoretical success. The distinction between empirical and 
theoretical successes can be summed up quite simply: “Empirical successes are contingent on 
the world outside the inquirers; theoretical successes are not” (Solomon 2001, 17). According to 
Solomon, empirical success is a primary goal of science, while theoretical successes are not. This 
is not to say that theoretical successes are useless, but rather that theoretical successes are not a 
necessary goal of science. 
 Empirical success comes in a variety of ways. It can be predictive, retrodictive, 
technological, explanatory, or observational to name a few. This variation occurs because 
different types of success may be desired or required in various fields. The same variation 
applies over time, as new types of empirical success advance the field. These variations prevent a 
uniform definition of what constitutes empirical success in science.  
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There are, however, two features that are important to understanding empirical success: 
robustness and significance. Robustness refers to the ability to reproduce the empirical successes. 
Empirical success that cannot be reliably demonstrated over time is not noteworthy success. 
Significance, on the other hand, is a qualitative measure of empirical success.  
Empirical success is significant when it is mostly attributable to the theory, rather 
than to prior knowledge shaping the application of a theory. Such significance is 
clearly produced when a theory has new empirical success. (Solomon 2001, 29) 
 
Solomon’s view of significance is restrictive enough that it picks out precisely what makes 
significant (empirically) without overextending into cases that are purely descriptive. For 
instance, in psychology there have been many theories that can reliably explain any behavior. 
The problem is that these theories do not have falsifiable conditions, and as such these successes 
are not significant. These theories can only be applied via prior knowledge in a retroactive sense 
to new cases. Theories that are significant can be applied to new cases and generate new 
predictions prior to any new knowledge. 
Solomon’s new insights lead her to a new form of scientific realism that she terms ‘whig 
realism.’ “Whig Realism gives novel explanation of empirical success in science” (Solomon 
2001, 33). Solomon creates this as a means of explaining how theories can generate significant 
empirical success, even when they are wrong. Since truth is as important to a theory as empirical 
success, Whig realism has methodological importance. It is whiggish in the sense that it involves 
looking back from the present and seeing the truth in past theories. To put it another way, Whig 
Realism looks back on past theories and claims that even though all of the statements of the 
theory are false, there is still ‘some truth in the theory.’  
To help demonstrate how there can be ‘truth in a theory’ without actual statements of the 
theory being true; we can look back at Priestley’s phlogiston theory. Priestley described a theory 
in which there were invisible properties in the atmosphere that were conducive to combustion. 
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Phlogiston theory had very robust and significant empirical success, despite the fact that the 
theory was false. It was later discovered that oxygen was the characteristic responsible for 
empirical success of phlogiston theory. The discovery of oxygen allowed for a separation of the 
‘correct’ portions of phlogiston theory, from the ‘incorrect’ theoretical structures.  
Solomon makes further effort to clarify that Whig Realism does not mean that successful 
theories are ‘approximately’ true. It does not mean that successful theories are ‘partly’ true. And, 
Whig realism is not whig history. The ‘Whig’ in Whig realism refers solely to an explanation of 
the empirical success attained by theories in their own time. It is a way of understanding how 
theories that are mostly (or completely) false can achieve empirical success.  
A Fresh Look 
Several philosophers have argued over the appropriate incorporation (or removal) of 
values from science.  For example, Ernan McMullin (1983) argues in favor of a ‘pure’ scientific 
practice that is free of non-epistemic values. Helen Longino (1990), by contrast, argues in favor 
of incorporating non-epistemic values into scientific practice as a necessary means of bridging 
the gap between data and hypothesis. Solomon brings a fresh look to this debate by introducing a 
new vocabulary that helps to focus the issue. Rather than referring to these factors as ‘biases’ or 
‘values,’ she refers instead to ‘decision vectors.’  
Decision vectors allow us to describe the factors that affect scientific reasoning from an 
epistemically neutral position. The name ‘decision vector’ comes from the fact that they 
influence our decisions in a particular direction. It is epistemically neutral because it does not 
describe the influence as positive or negative. Sometimes, as Longino rightly points out, non-
epistemic values can help push science in the right direction. Other times, as McMullin argues, 
these very same values can bias science in a negative manner. Because of the ultimate 
determination of whether or not a non-epistemic value is positive or negative is circumstantial, 
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Solomon argues that it is crucial to approach the issue from a neutral standpoint. Furthermore, 
the fact that we can’t escape from psychological heuristics means that we need a way to talk 
about non-epistemic values neutrally, so that we can better understand how they operate in such 
as way as to positively or negatively affect us. 
Solomon breaks decision vectors into two categories: empirical and non-empirical. 
Empirical decision vectors are preferences for theories with one or more kinds of empirical 
success. Non-empirical decision vectors are preferences for a theory for some other reason. So an 
empirical decision vector might be salience or availability of data, while a non-empirical 
decision vector might be elegance or simplicity. Salience and availability of data are empirical 
decision vectors because they demonstrate a preference for a theory with data. Elegance and 
simplicity are non-empirical decision vectors because they are not directly related to empirical 
success. 
 It is thinking in terms of decision vectors that allows us to put new perspective on 
scientific consensus and dissent. For example, they allow us to better specify adequate or 
inappropriate distribution of research effort.  
[T]here is a general need for a normative epistemology of science that applies at 
the social level. A descriptive epistemology is not enough. I have begun this…, 
suggesting that empirical decision vectors be equitably distributed, and non-
empirical decision vectors equally distributed. (Solomon 2001, 95) 
 
Since several theories may each have some empirical successes, research should be distributed 
accordingly. Thus, scientific dissent can be characterized as being such a case (one in which 
more than one theory has empirical success). Under such conditions, dissent is appropriate, and 
research should be divided equitably among the theories based on their empirical successes. 
Similarly, Solomon argues that non-empirical decision vectors should be distributed equally 
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among the theories. This equitable and equal distribution of decision vectors help to ensure that 
each theory gets a normatively appropriate amount of the research distribution. 
 Consensus, as Solomon puts it, is a special case of dissent. “Consensus can be viewed as 
a limiting case of dissent—when the amount of dissent approaches zero” (Solomon 2001, 118). 
Consensus occurs when one theory possesses all of the empirical successes1. When consent 
occurs, there is no longer a need to distribute resources to other theories. It is at this point that 
non-empirical decision vectors become the driving factor in research. Consensus comes in two 
types: shallow and deep. Since scientists can agree on a theory for different reasons, they may 
come to a ‘shallow’ consensus. ‘Deep’ consensus occurs when they all agree for the same 
reasons.  
 Solomon further adds that there is nothing intrinsically desirable about consensus. 
Consensus is not always conducive to science, and there are cases in which consensus has 
hindered or stagnated progress. Because of this, Solomon emphasizes that consensus is 
normatively appropriate in some instances and not others.  
Social Empiricism 
Given this framework, we can now fully realize what is meant by social empiricism. 
Social empiricism is an extended account of how dissent should be structured within the 
scientific community. As was stated earlier, consensus becomes an absolute limiting case of 
dissent.  Solomon argues that one can stipulate the appropriate distribution of effort in science on 
a spectrum ranging across differing degrees of dissent.  
 Solomon argues that dissent in science should be organized as follows: 
1. Theories on which there is dissent should always have empirical  
                                                 
1 Solomon’s claim that one theory can have all of the empirical successes is a controversial one, because of the 
underdetermination of theories by empirical evidence. Because this issue is far beyond the scope of this thesis, I will 
not debate Solomon’s claim here. 
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successes. 
2. Empirical decision vectors should be equitably distributed (in 
proportion to their empirical successes). 
3. Non-empirical decision vectors should be equally distributed  
(the same number for each theory). (Solomon 2001, 117-118) 
 
 From this layout, we can see that as one theory comes to acquire more of the empirical 
successes, they will also garner more of the research distribution. Non-empirical decision vectors 
must then be divided between the remaining theories. It follows from this that once one theory 
acquires all of the empirical successes, we can formulate the appropriate conditions for 
consensus as: 
1’. One theory comes to have all the empirical successes available in a   
domain of inquiry. 
2’. This same theory comes to have all of the empirical decision vectors, 
since all scientists working productively (with empirical success) are 
working within one theory. 
3’. Any distribution of non-empirical decision vectors is OK, but typically  
more will develop, over time, on the consensus theory, as the old theories fade 
away. (Solomon 2001, 119) 
 
According to Solomon, consensus should occur only when one theory has all of the empirical 
successes. Because of this, consensus should not be seen as the endpoint in a domain of inquiry. 
Anomalies, or other circumstances, may contribute to new theories and potentially new empirical 
success. Under the following conditions, for example, Solomon believes that it is appropriate for 
consensus to dissolve back into dissent:  
1”. A new theory has empirical success that is not produced by the   
consensus theory. (So, the new theory deserves attention.) 
2”. Empirical decision vectors come to be equitably distributed. 
3”. Non-empirical decision vectors come to be equally distributed.  
(Solomon 2001, 119-120) 
 
During this entire process, it is the empirical decision vectors that determine whether there 
should be dissent, consent, or dissolution of consent. Since these decision vectors are divided 
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among the members of the scientific community, they provide the ‘social’ aspect of social 
empiricism.   
 Solomon’s account provides an excellent framework for my own account. I plan to build 
off her foundation and expand upon some of the issues that are still left open. Social empiricism 
is a good account of how the division of scientific labor should be treated from the perspective of 
the scientists. I am interested in what this means for the layman when it comes to expert 
testimony.  
 It is not clear from this account which theory is to be seen as more ‘correct.’ We often 
think of the majority opinion in a community as being a more epistemically justified position to 
which laypeople should defer. Yet, Solomon’s account does not support this conclusion. She 
believes that each theory with empirical success should be considered to be a legitimate topic for 
scientific investigation. For example, Solomon argues that empirical success should be 
distributed equitably among the theories that the scientific community investigates. However, 
this approach does not work as well in the context of making policy decisions based on scientific 
information. A theory may have plenty of empirical success, yet have none of these successes in 
the policy area that is under consideration.  Thus, the amount of empirical successes is not 
necessarily a measure of epistemic superiority. To put it another way, the amount of empirical 
success loosely demonstrates the amount of ‘truth in the theory,’ which under Whig realism does 
not mean that the theory is any more or less true than another theory (the theory can very well be 
entirely false!). Moreover, policy makers may need to choose a particular theory as a basis for 
action; it may not be possible to act on more than one theory at a time in the policy arena.  For 
these reasons, we need a more adequate means of determining when it is appropriate to side with 
one or another theory in terms of appealing to experts.  
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Dissident vs. Loyalist
Ward Jones wrote a paper entitled “Dissident Versus Loyalist: Which Scientists Should 
We Trust,” (2002) in which he addresses the very issue that Solomon left open. In other words, 
he considers under what circumstances it might be appropriate for policy makers to side with 
“dissident” scientists (i.e., those who accept scientific views that differ from those held by the 
majority of scientists in a particular field). Jones took up this issue after a speech by President 
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, in which Mbeki compared the rejection of dissident scientific 
perspectives to the previous despotism there. In April of 2000, Mbeki claimed: 
We are now asked to do precisely the same thing that the racist apartheid tyranny we 
opposed did, because, it is said, there exists a scientific view that is supported by the 
majority, against which dissent is prohibited. The scientists we are supposed to put into 
scientific quarantine include Nobel Prize Winners, Members of Academies of Science, 
and Emeritus Professors of various disciplines of Medicine! (Jones 2002, 512) 
 
These are strong words from Mbeki, but they do well to highlight the importance of this question 
of how to respond to “dissident” perspectives within the scientific community. In Mbeki’s case, 
this policy decision determines whether thousands of people are given anti-HIV medication for 
the treatment or prevention of AIDS. 
 In order to further understand precisely what is at issue, let us look a little bit deeper at 
what exactly is being debated here. Mbeki’s position is that one should examine the merit of the 
two available scientific positions, not the numbers of scientists who accept each position. Thus, 
for Mbeki, the two positions are epistemically equal. The other view, argued for by Jones, is that 
the numbers do matter. The dominant position is the community position, and thus it carries 
extra weight because it toes the party line. Jones thinks that the issues involved in evaluating the 
scientific positions can be quite complex and should therefore be left, as much as possible, to the 
scientists themselves to sort out.  
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Testimony and Bias 
One way to put perspective on the dominant versus dissident debate is to treat them 
simply as testimonies. Under this view, Jones argues that we can examine the opposing scientific 
positions for bias. If one position demonstrates less bias, then we can say that the position is 
more likely to be accurate than the other position. However, Jones goes on to explain that the 
distinction is not that simple. Each side can be biased in an epistemic or non-epistemic way. 
Furthermore, the line between epistemic and non-epistemic bias is not always a clear one. Jones 
gives the following example: 
Jones is committed to a theory because Jones judges the theory to be more elegant than 
any of its rivals. (Jones 2002, 515) 
 
Jones claims that this statement is ambiguous with respect to bias, since it ultimately depends on 
Jones’ view of elegance. If Jones holds that elegance is a feature of a theory that is more likely to 
yield truth, then we can say that elegance is an epistemic bias for Jones. However, if by contrast, 
Jones does not believe that elegance correlates with truth, then Jones merely has a personal 
preference for elegance. This option would be a non-epistemic bias. 
 To help clarify this somewhat murky bias issue, Jones feels that we need to look for two 
characteristics, which if taken jointly, yield unbiased results. The first has already been 
mentioned. The decisions should be based on what the believer takes to be epistemic 
considerations. The second characteristic is that the decision should be ‘readily affected by 
counter evidence’ (Jones 2002, 516). Both of these characteristics are features of a communal 
scientific theory of acceptance.  
 In a communal scientific theory of acceptance, scientists publish their work. Through this 
act, they open their work to debate, and thus to counter-evidence. Arguments for and against the 
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published work cannot be advocated with the use of non-epistemic biases. The community works 
to sort through, and weed out biases, until it comes to agreement.  
It follows that the acceptance of a theory by a scientific community is evidence-
determined and evidence-sensitive. Acceptance does not occur if members of the 
community successfully question the theory at hand. (Jones 2002, 519) 
 
The arguments made on each side are matters of the evidence and inferences made from 
evidence to theory. Similarly, the challenges made to arguments are directed towards the 
evidence and inferences. This ensures epistemic discourse in the scientific community. 
Moreover, it points to the community acceptance of a theory as being truth-oriented.  
If this is true, then naturally, dissidents (regardless of status) are still set in opposition to 
the community and the community accepted theories. From the vantage of the layperson, this 
means that the dissident view is not epistemically equal to the community view. Jones’ point is 
simply that since the scientific community acts to filter out non-epistemic bias, then it less 
probable that the loyalist position will be affected by non-epistemic bias. The same is not true of 
the dissident position. Thus, in cases like Mbeki’s, one should opt for the loyalist position.  
Counter-evidence 
To close the issue at this point would be too hasty. Jones has put forth a compelling 
argument for the epistemic justification of deference to the majority. However, I do not think that 
this holds for anything but the most general of cases. Jones described Mbeki’s position as 
follows: 
Policymakers should decide what to do on a case-by-case basis, examining the evidence 
for and against undertaking a particular course of action… Policymakers should hear both 
sides, but ultimately they should do what they judge to be the best course of action. They 
should follow their own assessment of the evidence. (Jones 2002, 513) 
 
I do not think that Jones gives adequate respect to Mbeki’s position. He does not think that 
policy makers should evaluate scientific positions on a case-by-case basis; rather, he thinks that 
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they should follow his general rule of respecting loyalist positions. Perhaps, he feels that 
laypeople are not capable of sorting through the evidence.  
 So how would a case-by-case analysis make a difference? Let’s look back at some of the 
critical features of Jones’s argument. First, Jones wants to separate epistemic and non-epistemic 
bias in science. The issue was tricky, since Jones argued that there were times when it is 
somewhat unclear whether a particular bias is epistemic or non-epistemic. Second, Jones listed 
two conditions that, taken jointly, would yield a result that is as free as possible from non-
epistemic bias. Finally, he demonstrated that these conditions were met by a communal scientific 
theory of acceptance.  
 Solomon’s social empiricism presented us with a different way of analyzing the same 
sorts of situations. Recall Solomon’s discussion of epistemically neutral decision vectors and 
how they were employed. If we move to this neutral terminology, then we can suggest that Jones 
talk about empirical and non-empirical decision vectors rather than epistemic or non-epistemic 
biases. This, in turn, allows us to avoid the ambiguity of the term “bias.”  Factors such as 
elegance do not have to be categorized based on whether elegant theories are more likely to be 
true. Instead, elegance can be taken as a non-empirical decision vector and can be adequately 
analyzed by its relation to other decision vectors.  
 Furthermore, social empiricism meets Jones’ required conditions for bias-free results, and 
also meets the conditions for a communal scientific theory of acceptance. In fact, social 
empiricism gives us specific conditions by which we are able to judge whether there should be 
scientific consensus or dissent.  
In contrast to Solomon, consensus for Jones was a rather vague concept. Consensus 
occurred when the community accepted a particular theory. This acceptance is ‘dependent upon 
the lack of challenges made against them” (Jones 2002, 519). Consensus for Jones is therefore 
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vague, since it is not clear what the conditions are for community acceptance. On the one hand, 
we might interpret this quite literally, and argue that dissident positions are challenges, and thus 
there is no community-accepted theory. In which case, Jones’ argument for the communal 
acceptance of the dominant theory (as justification for its epistemic superiority) falls apart. If it is 
not communally accepted, it doesn’t possess the special status he wants to grant it. However, if 
we interpret his definition of consensus loosely, then we might say that consensus occurs when 
challenges do not arise for a period of time. But how are we then to interpret ‘do not arise for a 
period of time?’ 
In order to sort this out, we need to put some context on this situation. The case that Jones 
focuses on is AIDS, and whether or not HIV is the direct cause of it. Given the nature of this 
case, HIV is believed to be the cause of AIDS, and the issue was for many years closed. By 
social empiricist terms, we can say that the debate over HIV and AIDS reached consensus. For 
the social empiricist, this is because the dominant theory has all of the empirical successes. For 
Jones, it is because there are no challenges brought against it. The separation between these two 
views occurs in the next stage, dissolution of consensus.  
For Jones, dissenters should be taken as those that oppose the majority position. This puts 
them at odds with the community. The community’s acceptance of the theory seems to be a 
‘final word’ in the sense that the challenges that are now raised by the dissenters are not seen as 
challenges to the community accepted theory. This conclusion is derived from the fact that the 
dominant position is still given the previous ‘communally accepted’ status (and the epistemic 
bonuses that goes with it), despite the fact that the community does not accept (wholly) the 
position.  
From a social empiricist view, we can say that the dominant position can only hold such a 
status if it still retains all of the empirical successes. If that is not the case, then consensus is 
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dissolved back to dissent, and the new theory deserves attention, and distribution of research 
effort. Thus, it is assumed from Jones’ argument that this is the interpretation he means. 
However, this is not from evidence. At no point does he state that the people to whom Mbeki 
refers do not have empirical success in their theory. One would hope that Mbeki would only side 
with those who had some empirical success. Similarly, one would hope that Jones would not 
make consensus the ‘final word.’ But, hopes are irrelevant. All that is certain is that Jones’ 
argument is vague with respect to consensus and dissent, and since his argument hinges on a 
lucid account of consensus and dissent, we have to find his argument wanting. Therefore, we are 




Alvin Goldman’s paper “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust,” (2001) will serve to 
set the tone for the rest of this paper. In his paper, Goldman explores the issue from the 
viewpoint of the layperson. As such, he makes clear how he intends to define some of the key 
terms of the debate and then uses those definitions to delve deeper into some of the intricacies of 
our debate.  
 To begin, we should try to put some context on the relationship between layperson and 
expert. This understanding will help to elucidate the reasoning behind Goldman’s definitions of 
his terms. The relationship between layperson and expert has been seen for the most part as a 
matter of testimony from the expert to the layperson. This has led some authors to argue that the 
relationship leaves the layperson as being ‘blind.’ The term ‘blind’ here is meant to note the 
difference between an expert appealing to an expert and a layman appealing to an expert. In the 
case of expert appealing to an expert, the person doing the appealing has some knowledge in the 
domain of the expert to whom they appeal. This allows the person to do what Phillip Kitcher 
calls “calibration” (Kitcher 1993, 314-322). The person can use direct calibration, in which he 
uses his knowledge about the subject domain to assess the ‘weight’ he should give to the other 
expert’s testimony. Or, he can use an indirect calibration, in which he uses the opinion of another 
expert (of whom he has directly calibrated) to calibrate the expert’s testimony. In either case, the 
person is acting with knowledge within the domain.  
 By contrast, the layperson appealing to an expert is “blind” in the sense that the layperson 
has no knowledge in the expert’s domain. In this case, he has to take the testimony at face value. 
This means that when the layperson must decide between two expert opinions, he needs to find 
some means of justifying his choice of one expert over another. Unlike experts, he cannot fall 
back on his knowledge within the field to help classify one expert as being more credible. I don’t 
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see the state of being “blind” as necessarily being a bad thing. The layperson begins the debate 
from a neutral stance. Thus, he might hear the testimony uncolored by calibration.  Basically, my 
sentiment here is simply that calibration can give an expert a more proactive approach towards 
an expert’s opinion. Whether or not calibration is always beneficial, I think is debatable.  
 Goldman uses a good example to describe the layperson’s relationship to the expert. He 
describes the layperson as being in a similar position to that of a member of a jury. 
A listener—for example, a juror—did not himself witness the crime, and as no 
prior beliefs about who committed it or how it was committed… He wants to 
learn what transpired by listening to the testimonies of eyewitnesses. (Goldman 
2001, 90) 
 
The relationship is analogous because the eyewitnesses will claim to have knowledge of some 
event that the jury member knows nothing about. Furthermore, it is up to the jury member to sort 
out which eyewitnesses are more credible.  
 Having gotten a clearer picture of the relationship between laypeople and experts, we can 
turn to the terms. For Goldman, expertise can be divided into a few categories. First, there is an 
objective sense of expertise, “what it is to be an expert” (Goldman 2001, 91). This is better 
understood in contrast to a reputational sense, in which an expert is such because people “believe 
him to be an expert (in the objective sense), whether or not he really is one” (Goldman 2001, 91). 
The objective sense of expert relies on the individual having significant beliefs in true 
propositions, and fewer beliefs in false propositions than most people. However, this is not 
meant to imply that the expert is more accurate. It could well be the case that the few false 
propositions he possesses are critical.  
 Second, we divide experts into what Goldman calls the “strong” and “weak” senses. To 
understand this, we need to first make a distinction. We can say that a domain is made up of 
primary and secondary questions. Primary questions are questions that concern current research 
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in the field, while secondary questions are questions relating to evidence, or arguments related to 
primary questions. Thus, “the ‘strong’ sense of expert would be an expert who has extensive 
knowledge in a domain of both primary and secondary questions” (Goldman 2001, 92). The 
‘weak’ sense would be someone who has extensive knowledge, but that “knowledge is more 
restricted to the secondary questions” (Goldman 2001, 92).  
Evaluation 
With all of this knowledge of experts and the relationship between layperson and experts, 
what are the ways in which laypeople can evaluate experts? The first of these would naturally be 
to examine the arguments made by experts (Goldman 2001, 93). We can divide the claims made 
by experts into two categories: esoteric and exoteric. Esoteric claims are domain-specific claims 
of which the layperson cannot determine the truth values (Goldman 2001, 94). These are claims 
that may come from deep understanding of the domain. Exoteric claims, on the other hand, are 
claims that are outside the layperson’s typical domain of experience, but have a truth value that 
the layperson may have access to (either now, or at some point in the future) (Goldman 2001, 
94). This distinction is rather important since exoteric claims are claims that the layperson can 
reason with relatively well. Esoteric claims, however, are not only difficult to assess truth values 
for, but also limit the layperson’s ability to see the relationship between premises, or between 
premises and conclusion. 
 These claims become more important when we understand that laypeople can accept 
arguments based on direct or indirect justification. Direct justification of an argument is when 
the layperson understands the premises, as well as how the premises relate to each other and the 
conclusion (Goldman 2001, 94). Thus, the layperson is justified in accepting the argument 
because the argument makes sense. By contrast, indirect justification occurs when the layperson 
accepts the argument based on the superiority of argument given by an expert (Goldman 2001, 
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95). Here we are referring to the expert’s skill at arguing, whether it come in the form of debate 
or something else. Goldman uses the example of one expert presenting a counter-claim to 
another expert’s argument. When given the chance for rebuttal, the other expert is not able to 
counter each of the claims. Thus, the layperson may decide to go with the expert whose 
testimony was not defeated, not because he is convinced of the argument, but rather indirectly, as 
his challenger could not offer similar counter-claims (Goldman 2001, 95). 
 The second way that laypeople can evaluate expert testimony is to assess the quantity of 
experts that back the opinion in question (Goldman 2001, 97). This way is commonly used and 
has even become a precedent in the courtroom. However, the question of numbers can be very 
misleading. As such, Goldman divides the issue into two related questions. The first is still the 
quantity of experts, but the second is an appraisal of the experts’ credentials. The second 
question is aimed at sorting out the credentials of the people who agree with the expert.  
 The two examples that Goldman uses to highlight why numbers don’t necessarily impart 
more credence to an opinion are the issue of rumors, and the issue of a guru (Goldman 2001, 98). 
Rumors are usually widely believed. They are often well-circulated and accepted despite the fact 
that no-one has access to a “credible source” of the information. As is the case with rumors 
known as ‘urban myths,’ most rumors are false regardless of the number of people that believe 
them. 
 The other example is a bit more important. This example involves a guru and his students 
who slavishly believe what he believes. The reason that this issue is more important is because it 
highlights the second part of the numbers issue--that of the credentials of the people giving credit 
to the expert. One should look at the conditional independence of those that back the position. In 
the case of the guru, his students will believe whatever it is that he believes. Therefore, they do 
not have independence from his position. Perhaps, several scientists are getting funding from the 
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same company, and so they hold the same viewpoint on an issue, say the effectiveness of that 
company’s drug.  
 This latter point brings us to the next condition for evaluation, interest and bias (Goldman 
2001, 104). Here again, the issue of conditional independence is important. However, in this 
case, the conditional independence isn’t primarily between scientists, so much as between the 
scientist and his position. We can reformulate this issue by asking, ‘Is there some outside reason 
that is motivating the scientist to want to advocate this position?’ Scientists may exaggerate their 
findings (or the importance of their findings) in order to acquire (or maintain) funding. Goldman 
cites an article by Friedberg et al. (1999) in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
which examined the relationship between research reports made by company sponsors and 
independent researchers. Goldman says of this report, “Unfavorable conclusions were reached by 
38% of nonprofit-sponsored studies, but by only 5% of pharmaceutical company-sponsored 
studies” (Goldman 2001, 105). These are incredible findings. It helps to point out that the need 
for more in-depth evaluation by the layperson. 
 Our final consideration for evaluation by laypeople is the past track record of the expert 
in question. Goldman quickly points out that this can appear to be a tricky issue. After all, if the 
layperson has no knowledge in the domain of inquiry, how can he evaluate the expert’s past 
record of success? Is it not like the ‘calibration’ issue we discussed earlier? 
 To resolve this issue, we need to go back to the distinction between esoteric and exoteric 
claims. Some claims that may be exoteric now, may have been esoteric for a period of time 
previously. Goldman uses the following example: “There will be an eclipse of the sun on April 
22, 2130, in Santa Fe, New Mexico” (Goldman 2001, 106). Today, the statement would be 
considered esoteric. However, on that very day, any layperson in Santa Fe will be able to walk 
out into the street and evaluate the correctness of the statement. It will then be an exoteric 
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statement. This example is a bit extreme, in the sense that the people in 2130 won’t be evaluating 
the past track record of the expert (qua the claim here in 2006) in order to assess a claim the 
expert would currently be making in 2130. However, the point is still moving. Claims that were 
once esoteric can become exoteric overtime. It is precisely these types of claims that would serve 
as one means for the layperson to evaluate the past track record of experts.  
 None of these methods of evaluation are meant to be taken as the only means through 
which the layperson can appraise the credibility of experts. Goldman has merely explored the 
domain of this debate by focusing on the terms and the relationships that emerge. As such, 





I want to move in a slightly different direction than my predecessors. To begin, I want to 
use a notion of ‘expert’ that is more general. Under this account, ‘expert’ is taken to refer to an 
individual who has significant experience in a domain of inquiry. Naturally, this experience will 
also have to be current. This definition will envelop both Goldman’s strong sense of expert and 
his weaker sense. I somewhat dissolve his distinction because I wish to advocate an approach 
that can be taken more generally. I want to be able to put all experts on the “same page” so to 
speak, since the relationship between expert and layperson is alike in many ways regardless of 
expert level. In appealing to experts, it is not always clear whether we are dealing with a strong 
or weak form of expertise. And, as far as our discussion goes, the experts, that are being referred 
to as experts, will fall into both categories. However, I do not wish to completely ditch 
Goldman’s distinction. I find the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ notions to be useful, and will even apply 
them in a similar fashion to laypeople. For the remainder of the discussion, however, I will use 
expert to cover both senses of the term unless explicitly stated.  
 My next change will occur with the understanding of layperson. I will consider a 
layperson to be an individual who is appealing to the authority of experts. As with experts, this 
will be a general grouping that will have both a strong and a weak sense. In the strong sense of 
layperson, we are referring to individuals that have little or no prior knowledge in the domain of 
inquiry. Likewise, the weak sense of layperson is meant to refer to an individual who might have 
some degree of knowledge in the domain of inquiry (such as another expert). Since my account 
is meant to be taken generally, many of the factors that will be discussed influence both experts 
appealing to experts as well as laypeople appealing to experts.  
 Again, I do not mean to downplay the distinction between strong and weak laypeople. 
Just as with strong and weak experts, I find the distinction to be meaningful. However, I find 
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these sub-categories to be useful at a later point in the discussion. The present analysis will apply 
to anyone appealing to the testimony or authority of another regardless of the status of each. To 
further expand on this, let me describe the relationship in a bit more detail.  
The Relationship Revisited 
When we take the terms ‘expert’ and ‘layperson’ in a general sense, we are describing 
positions with specific guidelines and obstacles. The differences in weak or strong laypeople 
(and similarly experts) influence how these ends are met and how difficult the obstacles are to 
overcome. Nevertheless, though the degree of effort and specific approaches needed to meet 
guidelines and overcome obstacles may be different, the overall structure is uniform. 
 We can begin with the expert. What are the expert’s guidelines? And what are the 
obstacles that she faces? The expert is in a unique position, since she has knowledge at her 
disposal that is not necessarily available to everyone. Her ethical objective is to present this 
information in an understandable and unbiased manner. This is by no means an easy task. In 
order to do this, she must be motivated to try to understand and overcome the barriers that 
prevent effective communication with the layperson. The authority granted to her position by the 
expert-layperson relationship confers a duty on her (qua expert) to the layperson. In the case of 
science, this can be seen as a duty to the public good by scientists who receive public funding 
(through public or political means)(see Shrader-Frechette 1994). One finds the same duty placed 
on the head of a local church and even on the coach of a youth soccer team. Anytime that one 
finds an expert-layperson relationship, these duties and guidelines apply.  
 The expert is not without obstacles in this relationship. There is a great deal that she has 
to overcome. First, the expert must be able to translate from “special-ese” into, pardon the 
expression, “layman-ese.” This can be one of the most difficult tasks that the expert can face in 
this relationship. If an explanation is too technical, she risks losing the attention of her audience 
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and thus making the communication ineffective. On the other hand, by simplifying the message, 
she may further alienate her audience, who may feel talked down to or that perhaps the advice 
was so obvious that they failed to see the point.  
Here, we can note one instance in which the degree of expert and layperson may be 
shaded. A “weak” expert may not use as strong of a technical vocabulary and thus might not 
experience a language barrier that is as distant. Similarly, a “weak” layperson may already have 
acquired a decent technical vocabulary and thus not need the same treatment as a “strong” 
layperson. What matters here is not the degree of the gap between them, but simply that there is 
this language barrier to overcome. 
Second, the expert must be sure to avoid errors of framing and other biases (see 
Beauchamp & Childress 2001). Framing stems from presenting information in a way that 
encourages a particular response. For instance, many doctors will tell patients that they have a 
90% chance of survival rather than telling them that they have a 10% chance of dying. Even 
though the information is the same, the effect of the framing commonly produces a more 
favorable outlook when framed by survival than when framed as a chance of death. This puts the 
expert in the difficult position of having to give an accurate assessment based on her knowledge, 
while keeping the point clear for her audience. She is in the precarious position of stating the fact 
of the matter, without up- or down-playing it. This is difficult since the layperson may not 
always understand why certain results are significant, so the critical point lies in communicating 
the significance, without biasing the information with interpretation.  
Finally, the expert needs to understand her audience. This is to some degree a corollary of 
the previous two obstacles. Though it expands on them, this obstacle also addresses new 
conditions. For instance, there are times when the expert is asked to give an opinion that is 
outside the scope of her particular specialty, given that her field might be closely related to the 
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one at hand, or perhaps because her field is the closest applicable field. This is a different 
situation from the expert’s removal of bias. In bias removal, the expert weeds out decision 
vectors that may cause her to overstep her bounds. Here, the expert needs to understand what 
parts of her background are applicable to the task at hand, so that she can adequately address the 
issue. If she does not understand the motivation behind seeking her opinion, then no amount of 
bias removal or framing will help yield an accurate opinion.  
 The lay perspective carries its own guidelines and obstacles. The layperson can have 
numerous reasons for seeking expert advice. Perhaps she seeks an expert opinion on some issue 
for which she has no knowledge. Or, she may just as well be seeking a second opinion to help 
her make an informed decision. Regardless of what drives her motivations, she needs to pay 
special attention to the hardships that accompany her position. For example, one of the most 
important points that she needs to understand is that experts are fallible. Expert testimony will 
not grant certainty. One need only take a brief look throughout history to see how concepts have 
changed over time. The notion of a ‘caloric’2 immediately comes to mind. Because of this, the 
layperson should not hold expert opinion as absolute, undisputable fact. Likewise, she should not 
be seeking an absolute fact of the matter. Such expectations will lead only to disappointment.  
 The layperson should not seek answers from an expert that is outside the scope of her 
specialty. Though the layperson may not always be in a position to make such a distinction, she 
should be aware that just because a question can be asked does not mean that it will have an 
answer. This is especially important when it comes to matters of political importance. One 
should always be prepared to accept that there is no definitive answer for the time being, and that 
                                                 
2 Caloric was once a proposed ‘fluid’ whose movement constituted the gain or loss of heat. It has since been 
replaced with the term ‘calorie,’ which represents the amount of heat required to raise 1 gram of water 1 degree 
Celsius at 15 degrees Celsius. 
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more research is needed. Making hasty decisions may end up costing more in resources than 
taking the time for more careful research. 
 The layperson should also not seek to merely support her own intuitions. Seeking an 
expert to back up one’s opinion is not an adequate means of seeking expert testimony. The point 
of deferring to experts in the first place is to try to get a more informed viewpoint on the matter. 
Though we may often be biased towards our gut reasoning, seeking expert testimony to back up 
such gut feelings is no more objective than making the decision alone. One is seeking only to 
validate prior assumptions and is not in effect open to other points of view, thus rendering the 
matter essentially closed from the beginning.  
Here, it should be noted that ‘calibration’ can have an effect. A “weak” layperson may be 
able to calibrate an expert’s testimony. However, they should be aware that even such 
calibrations can serve to heighten this effect. Just as we should not seek to merely back up our 
intuitions, we should also not seek out information to simply “validate” our calibrations. We 
should note that this only applies to situations in which the information concurs with previous 
calibrations.  
 Another hang-up that she should be aware of is that not all expert opinions are good 
expert opinions. What I mean here is that some experts use their knowledge to advance particular 
views rather than to support objectivity. This may be one of the most difficult snags with which 
the layperson must deal. She must assess as much as she can about the person presenting her 
with information. What are this person’s affiliations and motivations? Are they advocating this 
view because it is the case, or because they have some bias towards promoting it? Recall the 
Goldman example in which a study from an independent pharmaceutical testing agency yielded a 
more critical result than one from the company’s own testing team. What is the content of their 
argument? As in, are they deliberately trying to go over your head to sway you with technical 
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esoteric jargon, or are they sidetracking you from the technical side too much with simple 
analogies?  
The layperson is not always in a position to distinguish between those who are experts 
and those that are trying to con them, but this does not absolve the layperson of the need to 
question the expert’s motivations. Accepting an opinion on blind-faith is no better than making 
an uneducated guess. She should remember that the goal in deferring to an expert is an effort to 
educate herself more efficiently before making a decision. What I have discussed thus far by no 
means covers the wide range of impediments that encumber each side in this relationship.  
Informed Decision Making 
Thus far, we have explored some of the different ideas surrounding the problem of 
expertise. Now it is time to bring everything together in a more uniform manner. Having 
explored the relationship of the expert and layman, we are now in a position to design a schema, 
or flowchart, that one can follow in order to make an informed decision.  
 If we recall, Jones made a strong argument for the use of numbers in our decision 
process. His argument was aimed at demonstrating the epistemic superiority of the majority 
position, and I believe it is safe to say that his advice is good advice, if we have no time or 
resources available to look deeper into the issue. Thus, we can say that our initial starting 
position within the flowchart to be: 
1- If no further information is available, go with the majority held position. 
Since this is the starting position, I feel we need to further clarify what exactly this entails. If we 
again recall Jones’ argument, we can see that the majority held position, all else being equal, has 
a degree of epistemic superiority. Since all experts are fallible, the majority may still be on the 
‘wrong’ side of this debate. However, if we cannot get any further insights into the problem, then 
we have to side with the position that is more likely to be on superior ground. It is only in the 
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event that we have more time, or more resources available to us, that our previous critiques of 
Jones hold up.  
 For instance, Goldman produced examples that demonstrated how going by numbers 
could yield a problematic result. But, the steps that we can take to avoid, or even assess, such a 
situation depends on our capabilities of having access to more information. It will rarely be the 
case that we do not have such time or resources. In the cases of public policy, one would hope 
that more extensive steps are taken to fully understand the problem. As in the AIDS case, the 
ultimate decision from the case affects whether or not a significant portion of the population 
receives HIV medication. Decisions like these should always merit some time devoted to 
exploring each side of the issue.  
 In the event that we are able to access more information on the issue, then we can move 
from our starting position to step 2.  
2- Why is the minority a minority? 
This is an important first step to take in the assessment of the two conflicting opinions. In 
this step, we are trying to understand the minority position in its relation to the community. Here, 
we are not looking at the issue of the numbers, but at the justification of their position. We can 
translate this question using Solomon’s terms as: ‘Does the minority position have any empirical 
success?’  
 We might find this question to have a simple answer, ‘no’. In such an event, we can 
effectively rule out the minority opinion and move on to the end of our flowchart. By contrast, 
the answer may in fact be ‘yes,’ in which case, we can then proceed to step 3.  
3- Are there any empirical successes on either side in the domain of inquiry? 
It is important for us to pause here for some added clarification. We might be tempted to 
ask ourselves, ‘Why not go directly from step 1 to step 3?’ It would appear as though the only 
 32
thing of interest to us is the particular domain in question (and hence the empirical success 
specific to that domain). Following from this, it may not immediately be clear why we should 
look at all at the empirical successes in general (as per step 2), since they may indeed not be in or 
related to the domain in question.  
Though this is a valid point, it must be stressed that step 2 becomes critical for two 
reasons. First, we are moving in steps based on the amount of information that we have available 
to us. As we noted in the initial step, it may be the case that we have no other information 
accessible. It follows from this, that just because we are able to have access to some information, 
it does not imply that we have access to much more information. Step 2 requires very little in the 
way of extra information on the problem at hand, yet it still provides us with a quick solution. If 
we recall the problems that arise by simply going by numbers, then we know that it may not 
always be the best position to take. However, if we can, by using very limited information, 
determine a powerful factor such as empirical success, then we can make a decision that is not 
purely a matter of numbers. There will be an important justification for siding with the majority. 
Keep in mind, empirical success does not ensure truth. However, empirical success shows that 
there is at least ‘some truth in the theory.’ Consequently, a lack of empirical success is just 
hypothesizing. And, we are certainly better to side with a position that can back itself up with 
data.  
The second reason that step 2 is important lies in the fact that it gives us a means to 
calibrate step 3. Just because a theory possesses some degree of empirical success does not mean 
that it has empirical success in the domain in question. Therefore, step 2 becomes the launching 
point for step 3. In step 2, we are to assess the empirical successes of the theory, while in step 3, 
we are to evaluate them. Though we might find a simple answer to step 3, such as only one side 
having empirical success in the domain of inquiry, and thus we can simply opt to side with that 
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position, it can just as easily be the case that neither side has any empirical success in the domain 
of inquiry. Through the evaluation of step 2, we know that there are empirical successes outside 
the domain of inquiry, and we can turn to those for further examination. 
Let us explore such a case. If we determine that as a result of step 3, neither side has an 
empirical success in the domain of inquiry, we are left evaluating the other empirical successes 
of each side. It should be stressed that at this point, we are essentially going to be making a 
decision with a lot of risk. Since neither side has any empirical success regarding the specific 
phenomena in question, we have drastically reduced our chances of getting a correct assessment 
of the problem. This does not mean, however, that we cannot still make the best of what we 
have. Should such a case occur, we should look at two things. First, are there empirical successes 
in related domains? And second, how unified is the theory based on its empirical success?   
Thus far, we have explored both what to do in the case that only one side has an 
empirical success in the domain of inquiry, and what we should examine in the event that neither 
side possesses any. Now, let us examine the third option. What should we do if both sides have 
empirical successes in the domain? For this, we need to turn to step 4. 
4- Can we reduce the community to a group of specialists? 
This step is crucial in many respects, so it is important that we take the time to understand 
the many facets of this step.  
 First, we might be tempted to ask ourselves, ‘Why do we not do this earlier?’ Or, we 
might ask, ‘Is this not what we have done initially by deferring to expert opinion?’ I think that 
these are valid concerns, but as with earlier steps, I think further intuitions will help to resolve 
these questions. It is not going to be the case that the expert to whom we defer is indeed the 
specialist himself.  
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Let us suppose that we have a committee of members from various fields. One of them 
may be an expert in physics, generally. This means that he has a significant understanding of the 
questions that drive research in many of the sub-fields of the physics community. In this respect, 
he may not have specialization in the area of inquiry, but may be a member of the board because 
he would have better insight into which sub-field (and thus which specialists) the problem might 
default to. Furthermore, if we examine the series of steps that we have taken thus far, we can see 
how someone in such a position might be able to adequately resolve the above steps.  
First, he can directly inform the committee of what the majority held position is, as well 
as, what some of the minority positions might entail. He would have access to this by being a 
‘generalist.’ Second, he would also be able to account for any empirical successes that the 
minority might have. Again, this would come from his knowledge as a generalist, and from 
publications in respected peer-review journals. Finally, he would also have access to knowledge 
of whether or not each side has empirical success in the domain of inquiry. He could derive such 
knowledge again from his expertise in the current issues of the various sub-fields.  Nevertheless, 
even though this expert might be a  good choice for membership on some committees, it might 
not be wise to trust his judgment on whether the majority or minority position is most likely to be 
correct (because he does not have detailed expertise in the domain under consideration).   
Now if we grant the feasibility of this case, and I certainly don’t see why not, then we 
have established a situation in which one might need to defer to a group of specialists 
themselves. In this case, the expert to whom we have been deferring simply doesn’t have the 
expertise in the area of inquiry, despite his knowledge of the major issues in that area.  
This is not the only reason that we might want to reduce the community to a group of 
specialists. By reducing the community from the community at large to a group of specialists, we 
are essentially removing some of the problematic factors that come along with taking the word of 
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the community on the whole. Remember, that earlier we established in our critique of Jones, as 
well as portions of Goldman’s work, that the numbers are not necessarily accurate. The 
inaccuracies can be attributed to a number of factors.  
One way is to derive them from an error of heuristics. Much of the community may be 
aware of the major questions and to some degree the success that a particular domain may have. 
These articles may receive more attention than some of the minor articles that explore the more 
technical details that are only important to the specialists themselves. Because of this, the 
availability heuristic may affect the community-at-large. In psychology, the availability heuristic 
states that we make decisions based on the information that is available to us via recall. For 
example, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) asked people questions such as, “Are there more words 
that start with the letter ‘k’ or words with ‘k’ as the third letter?” Despite the fact that there are 
more of the latter, it is easier for us to recall words in the former category. Thus, we misattribute 
the former as being more correct.  
It is entirely possible, though by far not necessarily the case, that one might base their 
opinion off of the amount of articles that are available to them in recall. The number of articles 
available to them does not necessarily reflect the content of those articles. However in the group 
of specialists, it is more likely that they will have access to all of the information available, and 
beyond that possess a significant understanding of each article’s importance. Under much the 
same format as Jones’ argument for the superiority (epistemically) of the majority opinion over 
the minority opinion, we can say that the opinion of the majority of specialists would be 
epistemically superior to the majority of the community itself. It may very well be the case that 
the majority view of the specialists is the same as the majority view of the community at large. 
But, this does not follow necessarily, and thus merits the extra examination.  
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By reducing the community-of-experts-at-large to a community of specialists, we are 
essentially returning ourselves back to the initial position in our flowchart. Barring further 
investigation, we are in a position to follow Jones’ advice and simply go with the numbers. The 
steps we have taken up to this point have increased the likelihood that going with the numbers 
will ensure the higher degree of accuracy. Essentially, the reduction can be seen to simply make 
the numbers “mean more” than they did previously.  
 Though we have improved the significance of the numbers, we have not yet removed all 
doubt. It can be said that in reducing the community, we tried to remove those who are siding 
with an opinion because perhaps it advocates the same theory that they operate under. One 
potential obstacle that appears from this reduction would be the possibility that the specialists 
simply exaggerate their case. They may give the impression that certain results in their field are 
more profound than they actually are.  
 To accommodate this possibility, let us look at our endpoint.  
5- Evaluate for factors that have a negative influence. 
This is the step that we will ultimately find ourselves at, and it is by far the most difficult 
of all. In this step, we are looking specifically for factors that Solomon referred to as “‘non-
empirical decision vectors.” It is in this step that we will do our last refining of the issue. It is 
here that we will be able to accommodate issues like the one of specialists overstating their case. 
By analyzing the non-empirical decision vectors, we may be able to determine to what extent 
extraneous factors are influencing the importance granted to a particular result.  
This is not the only method we can use. In this last step, we are trying to weed out as 
many biasing factors as possible. One area of importance that Solomon’s method misses is the 
issue of numbers. Remember that even when we progress fully through the chart, we ultimately 
arrive back at the issue of numbers. Some argument was given for the numbers being more 
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accurate here, but regardless of how improved the case is, we still have not completely handled 
some of the factors that arose in Goldman’s exploratory work. Recall that one point that 
Goldman stressed was the degree of separation between scientists. If one scientist is the crony of 
another, and he holds the view that he does because of his non-independence from the other 
scientist, then his view is not adding anything to the debate. Recall the example that Goldman 
gives of the guru and his followers; they all believe what they believe because the guru believes 
such.  
Therefore, we can use Goldman’s condition of independence to determine the degree to 
which the numbers mean what they do. This would be especially important to the issue of 
numbers that is left, when we complete a cycle through the chart. It is indeed possible that in 
reducing to the community of specialists that the matter of independence becomes increasingly 
important. After all, not only do the numbers mean more, but they are also derived from a 
smaller and in all probability ‘tighter’ group of scientists.  
Finally, as part of this last step, we need to focus on the incredibly difficult point of 
assessing not just the community, but ourselves. Though this is a difficult evaluation to make, it 
is nevertheless important. When evaluating ourselves, we should pay special attention to some of 
the psychological factors that can influence decision-making. Though these factors affect both 
the experts and laypeople equally, it is more important to the evaluation of our self. We should 
recall that this effort has been made so that we can make better decisions. Though we may 
choose to defer to the expert opinion, the choice we make is ultimately our own. As such, we 
should pay special attention to the factors that can affect this process.  
One of these factors that has yet to be mentioned is called ‘hindsight bias.’ Hindsight bias 
is akin to the “knew it all along” feeling. It may be the case that we had the correct intuition 
before ever evaluating the expert testimony. We should be careful, however, not to discount the 
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effort that was made. Simply because we had the correct intuition does not mean that we were 
justified in that intuition. One major point of all of this effort was to arrive at the most 
epistemically justified position, and not the best hunch.  
Hindsight bias can be a contributing factor to another condition called the ‘confirmatory 
bias.’ This bias causes us to seek out information that validates previously held intuitions. 
Because of this, we are more likely to discount an opinion that does not coincide with our own. 
Naturally, we can see how this plays off of the hindsight bias. If something confirms our 
previously held intuitions, we are more likely to feel we ‘knew it all along.’ Similarly, the feeling 
of having already known the answer in turn contributes to our confidence is our previously held 
intuition, and thus we discount other opinions.  
One approach that may aid us in this situation would be to try our best to analyze the non-
empirical vectors (including our initial intuitions) that might be influencing our own judgments. 
It may serve us well in our evaluation of the theories with respect to ourselves to create a new list 
of decision vectors. Rather than focusing purely on the decision vectors that apply to the 
scientists (and the reasons for their positions) is to examine ourselves from a similar perspective. 
Under such an approach, we could derive what are the empirical reasons that we have for 
accepting a certain position, as well as the non-empirical ones. 
By composing such a list, we would put ourselves in a better position to examine some of 
Goldman’s categories, such as direct versus indirect justification. Our list of decision vectors 
may help us to see that we were appealing to one theory over another directly, because we 
arrived at it purely as a matter of empirical decision vectors (in the new list), or indirectly, 
because we are basing the decision on non-empirical vectors.  
All in all, the evaluation of interests and bias serves to filter the final result of our inquiry. 
Though perhaps applicable to each stage of the process, this sorting would merely muddle the 
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previous steps. Each of the steps is intended to remedy a particular obstruction in our process of 
becoming more informed. I think that the process functions best if we leave each step as concise 
as possible, and thus more apt at achieving its desired effect.   
Potential Criticism 
Before I go further, I would like to respond to what I see are some potential objections to 
the process. The first criticism that one might offer would be to object to the return to numbers. It 
seems as though part of this process was designed to move away from the numbers. There were 
arguments made to highlight the problem of numbers, yet in the end, we are turning back to a 
majority versus minority issue, which should be subject to the same hazards as the larger 
community.  
I think this criticism is a bit misleading. The problems that were raised concerning the 
issue of numbers were not meant to ‘rule out’ numbers as a means of evaluation. They were 
meant to stress some of the complexities that come along with choosing by quantity. It would be 
a fruitless endeavor to keep reducing the community down to two or so disputers. Instead, we 
want to make an evaluation of the numbers. In some cases, as Jones might argue, numbers are all 
we have, and that’s fine. Given the circumstances, we did the best we could, and numbers do 
confer some degree of epistemic justification. However, if possible, we want to reduce the size of 
the community that we are deriving our number from. In this way, we restrict the community in 
order to get a more specific answer. The important point that needs to be stressed here is that the 
restricted group may not be divided like the community. In such a case, the majority opinion of 
the community may only be the minority opinion among specialists. 
To help make the numbers matter, we also have incorporated some of Goldman’s 
suggestions. Once we reach the final step, part of weeding out our biases lies in a further filtering 
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of the numbers. It is at that stage that we take into account the conditional independence of the 
scientists, as well as, any indirect justifications.  
Another potential criticism revolves around the degree of persistence. Does the layperson 
need to get so specialized? It seems that we are trying to turn the layperson into a specialist 
himself with the degree of information we expect him to understand and sort through. The 
question I must retort with is why must the layperson feel obligated to become a specialist? Is it 
not the layperson’s judgment that assesses their problem? Is it not also the time and resources 
that the layperson has available that do not also dictate the extent to which they must explore the 
issue? If the lay person thinks that they are content to cut it off their investigation early, then that 
is their choice. Obviously, the depth to which it should be pursued is contingent on the situation 
at hand. Some situations, like in a courtroom, will require significantly more attention, while 
other situations may require less. These are criteria for increasing the reliability of the informed 
decision process by the layperson, not absolute guidelines. 
 One final potential criticism that I would like to address concerns the abilities of the 
layperson. Can it not be said that we are assuming too much on the part of the layperson? Can 
the layperson actually accomplish this feat? Yes, I believe they can. Remember, this is a two-
way street. Part of the interplay between expert and layperson is the responsibility of the expert 
to present his case in a manner that can be understood. The whole weight does not bear down 
upon the layperson alone. This is a means to improve the capacity for the layperson to evaluate 
the claims of experts. Communication is to some degree, out of his hands. There are plenty of 
cases where the layperson may not be able to get all of his questions answered. For example, we 
can imagine time constraints serving this role.  Or in other cases, the layperson may receive the 





 The goal here has been to explore the previous literature in hopes of deriving a process 
that can account for the many complexities that come along with the issue of expertise. With this 
in mind, I tried to take a more general approach that would be as applicable to everyday 
decisions, as it is to important matters, like public policy. It was also my goal to bring together 
many important aspects of the literature together. The work of Solomon and Goldman explored 
different aspects of the territory, but in their exploration left us with lingering questions. Jones, 
instead, attempted to answer a question, but failed to account for the scope of the domain. It was 
through a synthesis of these views that this more comprehensive account was developed. I think 
the work suffices to fill in the gaps left behind, and bring some unity to the different theories.  
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